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Abstract 
In this paper we summarise some of our recent work on consumer behaviour, drawing on 
recent developments in behavioural economics, in which consumers are embedded in a 
social context, so their behaviour is shaped by their interactions with other consumers. For 
the purpose of this paper we also allow consumption to cause environmental damage. 
Analysing the social context of consumption naturally lends itself to the use of game 
theoretic tools, and indicates that we seek to develop links between economics and 
sociology rather than economics and psychology, which has been the more predominant 
field for work in behavioural economics.  We shall be concerned with three sets of issues: 
conspicuous consumption, consumption norms and altruistic behaviour. Our aim is to show 
that building links between sociological and economic approaches to the study of consumer 
behaviour can lead to significant and surprising implications for conventional economic 
policy prescriptions, especially with respect to environmental policy. 
Key words:  consumer behaviour, social context, environmental policy, game theory, 
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1. Introduction 
Much of the economics literature on game theory and the environment has focussed on 
issues such as the extent of collaboration between national governments in tackling global 
environmental problems, for example, climate change, a literature to which Professor Alfred 
Endres has made significant contributions – see Endres (1997), Endres and Finus (1998, 
1999, 2002) and Endres and Ohl (2002, 2003)  or on the interactions between firms or firms 
and governments, for example in the literature on trade and environment (see for example 
Rauscher (1997), Copeland and Taylor (2005), Ulph and Ulph (2007)). In this paper we 
review work which has remained a relatively neglected area by economists (in particular 
environmental economists), namely the behaviour in market settings of consumers with 
interdependent preferences1. 
There are three motivations for our interest in this topic. First, in regard to global climate 
change, it has been estimated that if one analyses the supply chains of commodities, then 
some 75% of UK emissions of greenhouse gases depend on choices made by the 
household sector, through their purchases of goods and services and practices which 
govern their use of energy for activities such as heating or washing, and the disposal of 
products (Bows at al (2012)). To tackle climate change it is therefore important to 
understand what might influence consumer behaviour. 
This brings us to our second motivation. While standard environmental economics 
arguments concerning the use of environmental taxes or emissions trading undoubtedly 
have an important role to play in changing consumer behaviour, it can be argued, as does 
Croson (2014) in her Keynote address at the 2013 EAERE Conference, that the 
conventional economic model of consumers as rational individuals concerned solely with 
their own well-being does not account for many aspects of consumer behaviour. An 
immediate implication is that we should draw on some of the insights from other social 
science disciplines to help enrich economists’ analyses and policy advice. The now well-
established field of behavioural economics seeks to provide such a broader perspective (for 
excellent summaries see Tirole (2002), Camerer, Lowenstein and Rabin (2004), Sobel 
(2005) and Bernheim and Rangel (2007)). But Croson went on to note that within the field of 
behavioural economics much, though not all, of the cross-fertilisation has been between 
psychology and economics (for example, prospect theory, sunk cost fallacy, biases in 
memory); she argued that it is now timely to seek to build closer links between economics 
and sociology by studying the behaviour of individual consumers embedded in a social 
context with other consumers. This provides the second motivation for this paper and 
explains why we study market environments. In tackling this issue we do not challenge the 
basic economic assumption that individual consumers are rational (in the sense of having a 
preference ordering satisfying standard assumption and choosing in line with those 
orderings) but rather we question the notion that consumers are narrowly concerned just 
with their own consumption rather than with their own consumption in relation to those of 
others in society.  
Finally we note that in analysing how individual consumers respond to the consumption of 
other individual consumers in market settings, it is natural to draw on the tools of game 
                                                             
1
 Sobel (2005) is an excellent review of models of interdependent preferences that best explain behaviour in 
non‐market settings, as in laboratory experiments of the ‘ultimatum game’. 
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theory for our analysis. Our aim is not to develop new results in game theory itself, but rather 
to apply standard results in game theory to inter-personal consumer behaviour. We believe 
our approach yields a number of useful insights in economic analysis, its application to 
environmental issues and its policy recommendations2. 
In thinking about how game theory and economics might link to sociology’s account of 
consumption we draw upon a useful conceptualisation of the field by one of the UK’s leading 
sociologists of consumption in Warde (1997). Warde noted first that the sociology of 
consumption had originally been closely linked to sociologists’ concern with class that draws 
on studies of production (see, for example, Bourdieu (1984)). In those formulations the 
individual’s habitus shapes her tastes; which means that an individual’s lifestyle or 
consumption pattern is an expression of her class position, involving both attempts to 
distinguish herself from some groups and to align her tastes with a peer group or class (see 
also Granovetter (1978))3. Warde argues that such analysis leaves little scope for individual 
choice in consumption, and he contrasts this with accounts such as Bauman (1988) which 
emphasises the decline of class and the rise of individualism and informalism (the 
dissolution of rigid and conformist patterns of consumption). 
Warde goes on to distinguish four trends based on where they locate according to two 
dimensions: informalisation vs stylisation (extent to which individual tastes are influenced by 
what others do), and individualisation vs communification (extent to which individuals act in 
their own interests as opposed to the interests of a broader group). His four trends are: (a) 
individual diversity (individualisation and informalisation) - see for example Featherstone 
(1987,2007); (b) market segmentation (stylisation combined with individualism) which leads 
to the emergence of niche markets – see for example Bauman (1988); (c) massification 
(stylisation and communification) in which mass advertising leads to the emergence of global 
brands like McDonalds – see for example  Ritzer (1993); and (d) structural division,  in which 
some social differentiating principal such as class, ethnicity or nationality becomes more 
pronounced (as noted above, this is essentially the trend emphasised in Bourdieu (1984)). 
We shall draw on aspects of Warde’s analysis in setting out the issues discussed in this 
paper. We identify four aspects.          
(i) Individual diversity. We start from the same basis as Warde (1997) in that his 
concept of individual diversity comes close to the standard neo-classical 
economic model of consumption in which individuals seek to pursue their own 
self-interest and are only minimally (since self-interests are, to some extent, 
shared with others) influenced by the tastes of others.4 However since this is the 
standard model we do not analyse this any further in this paper.  
(ii) Competitive or conspicuous consumption. This dates back to Veblen (1924) 
combining individualisation and stylisation but in a competitive way whereby 
                                                             
2
 Another illustration of our interest in this topic derives from a conference on Sustainable Consumption: Multi-
Disciplinary Perspectives, held by the Sustainable Consumption Institute at University of Manchester in 2012. 
The proceedings are forthcoming in Southerton and Ulph (2014) and include an Introductory chapter which 
summarises the different disciplinary approaches to consumption.   
3
 This is also related to an analysis of consumption which focuses on habits and practices of consumption – see 
Bourdieu(1990), Warde and Southerton (2012). 
4
 Simmel’s (1903) classic essay ‘The Metropolis and Mental Life’ argues that a fundamental characteristic of 
modernity is that individual preference can only be understood – or recognized – through the degree of similarity 
or difference from the preferences of others. 
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individuals lose esteem if their consumption of some good(s) which signal their 
status is below some average of the reference/peer group and gain esteem if 
their consumption exceeds the average. This is often held to lead to 
‘overconsumption’, with potentially damaging implications for the use of 
environmental resources (see, for example, Schor (2010)).  
(iii) Consumption norms. This can be thought of as combining stylisation with an 
aspect of communification in the sense that individuals use consumption of some 
goods to signal their wish to belong to a particular social group or to conform to 
the norms of the groups with whom they identify.5 Unlike competitive 
consumption this can lead some individuals to consume more than might 
otherwise have done, but others to consume less.  
(iv) Altruistic consumption which can be thought of as combining informalisation and 
communification in the sense that consumers are not influenced by what other 
consumers do with respect to private consumption, but they recognise the 
potential environmental harm done by some forms of consumption, and, contrary 
to the usual free rider assumption in neo-classical economics, voluntarily reduce 
their consumption of environmentally harmful goods. 
We can think of these four models of consumption behaviour as increasingly pro-social and 
decreasingly self-interested. 
This paper will be concerned principally with the broad conceptual analysis of these issues, 
rather than with applications to any specific good. Nevertheless, it is important to consider 
what features of commodities or behaviours might make them relevant for our analysis. We 
believe the key characteristics, particularly for competitive consumption or consumption 
norms, include: (a) the consumption of these goods needs to be visible to other consumers; 
(b) they should be goods whose consumption almost all relevant individuals might engage 
in; (c) they are goods which can provide some form of coordination of individual actions (e.g. 
common times at which consumption or activities take place); (d) there are implicit social 
sanctions for deviating from some pattern of consumption – loss of face in the case of 
competitive consumption or exclusion from a group in the case of consumption norms. For 
specific issues related to the environment it is obviously important for the consumption of 
these goods to have a significant detrimental effect on the environment. 
Now there may be many goods which have the characteristics noted above, and we want to 
emphasise that our analysis does not seek to explain which commodities emerge as being 
significant for any particular form of social interaction for any particular group6. As a related 
point we will not construct an explicit repeated game formulation of the issues we study, but 
view our analyses as short cut versions, even reduced forms, of a more explicit analysis. For 
example, our analysis suggests that, as in most repeated games, there may be multiple 
equilibria7, and it is not possible using game theory itself to determine which of these 
multiple equilibria will be selected. We look to more detailed anthropological or sociological 
                                                             
5
 It is worth noting that consumption norms are not entirely elective as, even in cases where an individual 
wishes to belong to a group, belonging requires that members of the group recognize and accept that 
consumption norms are being performed competently (Warde (1994)). 
6
 For example, conspicuous consumption might be more pertinent to young people, perhaps because their 
own preferences have not been fully developed. 
7
 This is particularly true in our analysis of consumption norms 
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analyses to address such issues. This relates to a much broader debate in game theory 
(Mailath and Samuelson (2006)) 
As noted this paper is concerned mainly with the theoretical analysis of the issues (ii) – (iv), 
and in particular with identifying the extent to which the results derived would conflict with 
standard results from consumer theory. But we will also offer some comments on the 
empirical implications of the work (how would we identify whether the effects we allow for are 
really present) and the policy implications.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 will summarise our results on competitive 
consumption, Section 3 our results on consumption norms and Section 4 our results on 
altruism. In Section 5 we draw together some broad themes, consider some of the empirical 
and policy implications, and suggest directions for future work. We note that in Sections 2-4 
we will just sketch the models we have developed, in some cases using specific functional 
forms, and refer readers to our papers for the more detailed analyses. 
2 Competitive Consumption 
The central idea in this section is that people care about their status in society – whether 
they have done well or badly in comparison to some relevant group of peers.  There are 
clearly many factors that might determine status, but it is hard to convey this detail to others, 
so a short-hand way of signalling status is through the consumption of one or more of a 
number of status goods – cars, houses, exotic holidays, jewellery etc - that are used as 
litmus tests of success. For these to work as status goods their consumption has to be 
clearly observable by others,  which is why such consumption is often referred to as 
conspicuous consumption – a term introduced by Veblen (1924).   
As explained above, in this section we don’t try to explain why some goods play this role.  
Rather we take the existence of such goods as given and critically examine one of the main 
implications of the existence of such status goods – that they lead to a ‘rat race8’ in which 
individuals over-consume in order to gain status relative to their peer group and to 
distinguish themselves from others, with a consequent need to fund this extra consumption 
by either working harder or saving less (see, for example, Frank (1985), Schor (1998)).  This 
is particularly important given that some of the goods that play this role may also be 
associated with high levels of pollution, which leads us to examine the implications for 
environmental policy.   
Conspicuous consumption finds expression in any model in which a household's utility, or 
felicity, is a function not only of its own consumption of goods and services but also its own 
consumptions relative to the consumption of goods and services by its peer group. A 
standard economic argument is that because the consumption of other people has a 
negative effect on an individual’s utility or felicity, this is a form of externality which should be 
corrected by a tax on goods whose consumption is deemed conspicuous9. This would be in 
addition to any Pigovian tax imposed to reduce the damage to the environment. 
                                                             
8
 Sometimes referred to as “Keeping up with the Jones”. 
9
 The Veblen effect has also been invoked to help explain the Easterlin Paradox (Easterlin (1974), (2001)) 
whereby average life satisfaction (as measured by surveys of happiness) in advanced economies has stayed 
constant over the past few decades, despite rising levels of per capita income. This is consistent with the ‘Red 
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However, as noted by Arrow and Dasgupta (2009), the empirical evidence in support of the 
Veblen effect is rather mixed (Maurer and Meier (2008), Kapteyn et al (2007)). Arrow and 
Dasgupta developed an inter-temporal10 model of consumer behaviour in which, depending 
on what is assumed about how many goods (including leisure) are subject to a conspicuous 
consumption effect and the precise form of individuals’ utility functions, the existence of a 
conspicuous consumption effect may lead to no market distortion. However their basic 
argument does not depend on the inter-temporal structure, and in the next section we set out 
a simple atemporal model which captures their key insight. 
2.1 A Simple Model 
We consider a timeless economy, and, for the moment, ignore any issues to do with 
environmental externalities.   There is a continuum of households, indexed by i, who are 
distributed uniformly in the unit interval. We normalise by setting population size at 1.   
Initially we assume that: (i) households are identical;  (ii)  each household supplies a unit of 
labour inelastically;  and (iii)  labour is numeraire – so its price is normalised to 1. 
There are two consumption goods, labelled by k (= 1, 2). Let 
h
k
c  denote household h's 
consumption of k.   A general formulation would postulate the existence of a set of, possibly 
overlapping, peer groups - one peer group for each household and one set of peer groups 
across households for each consumption good.11    To begin we simplify by imagining that 
each household's peer group is the entire population (ecologists call this extreme case a 
"mean field" model). 
So define: 
    
1
0
, 1,2
h
k k
c c dh k= =∫ .    (1) 
to be the average consumption of k in the population.  Let , 1, 2
h
h k
k
k
c
r k
c
= =  be household 
h’s consumption of commodity k relative to that of its peers. If consumption of k is 
conspicuous/competitive, 
h
k
r  enters positively in each household's felicity function. So 
people feel good about themselves if they consume more than their peers, and bad about 
themselves if they consume less than their peers. 
Production of each consumption good requires only labour, at constant returns to scale. The 
market for both goods is competitive. If a unit of labour produces 1/pk units of good k, the 
competitive market price of good k is pk. We start by assuming that only the first of the two 
goods is a status good.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Queen effect’ whereby everybody increases consumption to try to do better than their peers, but in the end this is 
self-defeating because everyone’s consumption increases.  
10. Cowan, Cowan and Swann (1997) present a simple model of the dynamics of how consumption might evolve 
as people seek to make their consumption more like those of an aspiration group and differentiate it from those in 
a distinctive group. But their model does not allow for welfare analysis. 
11.   The set would be empty if the corresponding good were inconspicuous. 
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2.2 Single Status Good 
With just good 1 acting as status good, we may express household h's felicity function as 
   ( ) 11 2 1 1 2
1
, , , ,
h
h h h h h c
u c c r u c c
c
 
=  
 
     (2) 
We assume that u(.)  is strictly increasing in all three arguments12 and is also strictly 
concave13. 
The Market Economy 
In a market economy each household takes the average consumption of good  1 as given.          
The problem facing household h is to choose 
1 2
  and  
h h
c c  so as to maximize 1
1 2
1
, ,
h
h h c
u c c
c
 
 
 
  
subject to the budget constraint: 
1 1 2 2
1
h hp c p c+ ≤  Throughout the analysis that follows we 
will consider only interior solutions where the consumption of both goods is positive and the 
budget constraint holds with equality, so 
    
1 1 2 2
1
h hp c p c+ =      (3) 
The first order conditions of the maximization problem are 
   ( ) ( )
1 11 2 1 1 2 1 1
1
1
, , , ,
h h h h h h h
c ru c c r u c c r p
c
µ+ =    (4) 
and 
    ( )
2 1 2 1 2
, ,
h h h h
cu c c r pµ=      (5) 
where 0
hµ >  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint in (3).   
Expressions (3) (4) and (5) characterise the consumption choices of a typical household, 
taking as given the average consumption of good 1 across all households, 1c .  To complete 
the analysis we have to determine this average level of consumption.   
Since each household’s consumption depends on the consumption of other households, and 
since, in making their consumption choices, each household takes as given the consumption 
of others, in order to move from individual household consumption to the simultaneous 
determination of the equilibrium consumption of all households, the relevant equilibrium 
concept is that of a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.  Because, by assumption, households 
are identical, in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium the consumption of each of the two 
goods will be the same across all households.  In particular this implies that for all h 
1
1 1
1
h h
c c r= ⇒ ≡ .   Moreover 
hµ  is independent of h.  
                                                             
12
 Notice that this implies that utility is a decreasing function of the average consumption of good 1 by i’s peers. 
13
 Given our assumption that households are identical the function u(.) is the same across all households. 
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Let the super-script M denote an equilibrium market allocation.  Given our assumptions, 
there is a unique market equilibrium , 1, 2
M
k
c k =  characterised by: 
   ( ) ( )
1 11 2 1 2 1
1
1
, ,1 , ,1
M M M M
c rM
u c c u c c p
c
µ+ =    (6) 
and 
    ( )
2 1 2 2
, ,1
M M
c
u c c pµ=      (7) 
and the budget constraint 
    
1 1 2 2
1
M M
p c p c+ =      (8) 
An important difference between individual behaviour as characterised by (3)-(5) and market 
behaviour as characterised by (6)-(8) is that the latter will be subject to multiplier effects.  So 
a change in some exogenous factor – such as price – that could cause the consumption of 
good 1 by a particular household, h, to change will cause others to react both to the change 
in the factor and the change in consumption of good 1 by household h.  But this change in 
consumption of good 1 by other households will cause a further change in consumption by 
household h – and so on.  
The Socially Optimizing Economy 
Now consider the socially optimal allocation. Because households are identical and utility is 
strictly concave, the social planner will want everyone to consume the same amount of each 
of the two goods.  That is the social planner will enforce the condition that for all h 
1
1 1
1
h h
c c r= ⇒ ≡ . The social planner's problem is therefore to choose the common level of 
consumption of each of the two goods , 1, 2
k
c k =  in order to maximise ( )1 2, ,1u c c ,  subject 
to the budget constraint 
1 1 2 2
1p c p c+ = . Let the super-script "S" denote "social optimum".  
The social optimum allocation ( )1 2,S Sc c  is the unique solution of equations 
   ( )
1 1 2 1
, ,1
S S
cu c c pρ=      (9) 
and 
    ( )
2 1 2 2
, ,1
S S
cu c c pρ=      (10) 
and the budget constraint  
    
1 1 2 2
1
S S
p c p c+ =      (11) 
where  ρ (> 0) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. 
By comparing equations (6) and (9) we can see clearly the consumption externality that arise 
from competitive consumption (the second term on the left hand side), since individuals’ 
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concern over status – relative consumption – increases their marginal value of an additional 
unit of consumption of good 1 above the direct enjoyment that this will bring.  This is a 
consideration that is ignored by the social planner, so giving rise to the phenomenon of over-
consumption.  
Example:  Consider the Cobb-Douglas case where: 
 ( ) (1 )1 2 1 1 2 1, , , 0 1; 0, 0; 1u c c r c c r
αθ α θ ϕ α θ ϕ θ ϕ−= < < > > + < .   
Standard properties of Cobb-Douglas utility functions imply: 
1 1
1 1
;
M S
c c
p p
αθ ϕ
θ ϕ α
 +
 
+ 
= = . It is 
easy to see that  
1 1
M S
c c
αθ ϕ
α
θ ϕ
+
> ⇒ >
+
 so there is indeed excessive consumption of the 
status good.   
To correct this externality what is required is a tax 
1
0
Sτ >  such that 
   ( )1 1 1 1M S Sc p cτ+ =      (12) 
Proposition 1. When there is a single status good then the market outcome results in 
excessive consumption of this good. This externality can be corrected through the imposition 
of a tax on the status good.   
2.3    Extension to Labour Supply 
One application of this single status good model that has been widely studied is that where 
the two commodities are consumption and leisure and the concern over status arises in 
connection with income/consumption.  So utility can be expressed as ( ), ,u c rl  where c > 0 
is individual household consumption, , 0 1≤ ≤l l  is individual household leisure and r > 0  
is a household’s consumption relative to that of their peers.   
Now, in the context of labour supply it is no longer possible to assume that everyone is 
identical, because, even if one continues to assume that preferences and hence felicity 
functions are identical, it is important to recognise that, for any given amount of work, 
individual earnings will differ because of differences in productivity etc.  This raises the 
question as to which is the relevant comparator group that people use when thinking about 
their relative income/consumption.  Consistent with the approach taken above one possible 
assumption is that individuals compare themselves with others who are like them – i.e. have 
the same productivity.  This implies that, in the Market allocation the consumption/income of 
each household relative to that of their peers is 1.  
By analogy with the results discussed above, this implies that status considerations lead 
individuals to supply an excessive amount of labour and that the optimal rate of income tax 
10 
 
should be higher than would arise were such status concerns absent – see, for example, 
Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) for an early analysis14.   
As noted in Ulph (2014), there is however an interesting further implication Suppose that 
some tax/benefit system is in place whereby there is some universal benefit, B,  that is 
available to everyone and that any income earned on top of that is taxed at some constant 
marginal rate , 0 1t t< < .  For every level of the (net) wage rate, ω,  we can calculate the 
Nash equilibrium levels of consumption and leisure as set out above, and substitute these 
into the utility function to obtain household well-being - indirect utility, v - as a function of the 
net wage.   
As is standard there will be a range of net wage rates [ ]0,ω  over which households will 
choose to do no work and so have a level of income/consumption equal to the universal 
benefit. For all these households indirect utility will be constant and equal to ( )0 ,1,1v u B= .  
Consider now a household whose net wage rate is sufficiently high that it chooses to supply 
a positive amount of labour, and consider the marginal impact on that household’s indirect 
utility of a unit increase in the net wage rate.  There will be two effects. 
(a) The first is the standard effect that a higher net wage will make the household 
better off - increase indirect utility - at a rate that is proportional to the amount 
of labour supplied by the household.  This is the conventional result captured 
by Roy’s Identity.  
(b) The second is that the increase in the net wage will induce the household to 
work harder, but, because of the multiplier effect identified above, this will 
lead all households with the same net wage rate to over-supply labour.  So 
the increase in the wage rate will exacerbate the distortion caused by the 
Veblen effect and this will lower utility.   
 
Taken together these results imply that for households with a positive but low level of labour 
supply the second effect dominates the first and well-being will actually fall as the net wage 
increases.  So the relationship between well-being and the net wage rate is as illustrated in 
Figure 1.  So we have: 
Proposition 2   When the status good is income/consumption then the household that has 
the lowest level of well-being is no longer the household with the lowest (net) wage.  The 
worst-off household will have a high enough wage to make it worth working, but will be 
supplying a relatively small amount of labour. 
 2.4 Multiple Status Goods 
Suppose now that both goods are status goods.  A simple observation is that, with a fixed 
budget constraint, it cannot be the case that households over-consume both goods.  While 
this set-up may seem implausible in the a-temporal framework employed here, it has greater 
resonance in the inter-temporal setting employed by Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) where 
there is an inter-temporal budget constraint that ties together behaviour in different periods.  
So the question is what can be said about which, if any, of the two goods is over-consumed.   
                                                             
14
 As noted above this framework is also used to explain the Easterlin paradox. 
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The felicity of household h is now given by: 
   ( ) 1 21 2 1 2 1 2
1 2
, , , , , ,
h h
h h h h h h c c
u c c r r u c c
c c
 
=  
 
.    (13) 
Maximising this with respect to the budget constraint (3) gives first-order conditions: 
  ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1
, , , , , , , 1, 2
k k
h h h h h h h h h
c r k
k
u c c r r u c c r r p k
c
µ+ = =   (14) 
Given that households are identical, in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium it must be the 
case that for all h 1, 1,2;
h h h
kk k
c c r k µ µ= ⇒ ≡ = = .  Once again there is a unique market 
equilibrium , 1, 2
M
k
c k =  characterised by: 
  ( ) ( )1 2 1 2
1
, ,1,1 , ,1,1 1,2
k k
M M M M
c r kM
k
u c c u c c p k
c
µ+ = =   (15) 
and the budget constraint (8).  
In the social optimum the social planner will once again want to enforce the condition that for 
all h 1, 1,2
h h
kk k
c c r k= ⇒ ≡ = . The social planner's problem is therefore to choose the 
common level of consumption of each of the two goods , 1, 2
k
c k =  in order to maximise 
( )1 2, ,1,1u c c ,  subject to the budget constraint 1 1 2 2 1p c p c+ = . Let the super-script "S" 
denote "social optimum".  The social optimum allocation ( )1 2,S Sc c is the unique solution of 
equations 
    ( )1 2, ,1,1 , 1,2k
S S
c ku c c p kρ= =    (16) 
and the budget constraint (11). 
Comparing (15) and (16) it is clear that whether or not a commodity is over-consumed is 
going to depend on the relative marginal utility it confers as a status good compared to the 
marginal utility from the direct enjoyment it confers. Specifically if we define , 1,2
k
kα =  by  
( ) ( )1 2 1 2
1
, ,1,1 , ,1,1 , 1,2
k k
M M M M
r k cM
k
u c c u c c k
c
α= =  , then (15) can be re-written as 
   ( )1 2, ,1,1 1,2
1k
M M k
c
k
p
u c c kµ
α
= =
+
    (17) 
And if we compare this with (16) then we have: 
Proposition 3   If  
1 2
α α=  then the market equilibrium coincides with the social optimum.  If 
( )1 2 1 2resp.α α α α> <  then, in the market equilibrium there is an over- (resp. under-) 
consumption of good 1 relative to the social optimum. 
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Example: Consider the Cobb-Douglas case15 where: 
 ( ) (1 ) (1 )1 2 1 1 2 1 2, , , 0 1; 0 1; 0, 0; 1u c c r c c r r
αθ α θ βϕ β ϕ α β θ ϕ θ ϕ− −= < < < < > > + < .   
Standard properties of Cobb-Douglas utility functions imply: 
1 1
1 1
;
M S
c c
p p
αθ βϕ
θ ϕ α
 +
 
+ 
= = . It 
is easy to see that  
1 1
,  and so  
M S
c c
αθ βϕ
α β α β α
θ ϕ
+
> ⇔ > > ⇔ >
+
.   
2.5   Environmental Externalities 
Now suppose that there is environmental harm  ( ) , 1, 2kkD c k =  caused by the 
aggregate/average consumption of good k, where these damage functions are strictly 
increasing and convex.  
Given our assumption that, in making their consumption decisions, households treat the 
average level of consumption as given, it follows that individuals will ignore these 
environmental externalities and so the market equilibrium will be characterised by (15) and 
the budget constraint (8). 
However the social planner will see the connection between the consumption of every 
household and average consumption and so will choose the common level of consumption 
of each of the two goods , 1, 2
k
c k =  in order to maximise ( ) ( )
2
1 2
1
, ,1,1
k k
k
u c c D c
=
−∑ ,  
subject to the budget constraint 
1 1 2 2
1p c p c+ = .  The social optimum allocation ( )1 2,S Sc c is the 
unique solution of equations 
   ( ) ( )1 2, ,1,1 , 1,2k
S S S
c k k ku c c D c p kρ′− = =    (18) 
and the budget constraint (11).    
If, by analogy  with the analysis in the previous sub-section we now define , 1,2
k
kα =  by  
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2
1
, ,1,1 , ,1,1 , 1,2
k k
M M M M M
r k k k cM
k
u c c D c u c c k
c
α′− = =  , then we have: 
Proposition 4   If  
1 2
α α=  then the market equilibrium coincides with the social optimum.  If 
( )1 2 1 2resp.α α α α> <  then, in the market equilibrium there is an over- (resp. under-) 
consumption of good 1 relative to the social optimum.  
                                                             
15
 Arrow and Dasgupta consider a range of functional forms and parameter values for which this result might 
obtain. Cobb‐Douglas is just one such special case. 
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So it is conceivable that even though there are both consumption and environmental 
externalities the market outcome is the same as the social optimum and there is no need for 
any corrective taxes. No doubt this is empirically unbelievable. We draw attention to this 
knife-edge case only because it says the market bias in competitive consumption is not self-
evident.  
Finally, return to another extreme case - that of a single status good - where the bias is 
easily obtained.  Here we imagine that good 2 is inconspicuous and is pollution-free, 
whereas good 1 suffers from competitive consumption and has adverse environmental 
consequences. That competitive consumption may well also be resource intensive 
(conspicuous consumption in automobiles and air travel) should not surprise. The gap 
between the market price and social worth of environmental resources has meant that 
technological innovations are biased against nature. Entrepreneurs, understandably, seek 
innovations that economize on expensive factors of production, not those that are cheap. It 
should be no surprise, then, that modern technology is rapacious in its use of nature's 
services. 
Clearly there will be over-consumption of good 1, and a consumption tax on good 1, based 
on both consumption and environmental externalities, is the obvious public policy. The 
analysis however suggests an intriguing possibility for nudging social norms. Imagine 
households were able to coordinate their socially competitive urge on good 2 (the 
environmentally friendly commodity).   In that case culturally defined competition for good 2 
could in some sense dilute environmental pollution on good 1 and lead towards a socially 
optimal allocation. 
3. Consumption Norms 
In the previous section consumption decisions of individuals were influenced by those of 
others in a competitive manner as individuals sought to match their consumption to that of 
an aspirational group (and differentiate it from that of a distinction group). Such forms of 
externality can sustain overconsumption and a market distortion that needs to be corrected 
by a policy such as a tax on goods prone to conspicuous consumption. In this section we 
consider a different route by which individuals’ consumption decisions may be influenced by 
those of others, namely through a desire to be seen to belong to a group of similar-minded 
individuals, thereby establishing consumption norms16. A key difference between this section 
and the last is that the proclivity to conform to a consumption norm can lead some 
individuals to reduce their consumption of a good relative to what they would have 
consumed in the standard economists’ model where consumers take no account of the 
consumption of others. 
There are a number of potential direct benefits that consumers might derive from adhering to 
a consumption norm (see for example Hargreaves-Heap (2013), Hargreaves-Heap and 
Zizzo (2009)). These include: (a) observing members of a norm group consuming a product 
an individual has not experienced can give implicit information about the quality of that 
                                                             
16
 The most influential sociological theories of consumption – especially Bourdieu’s (1984) account of taste and 
distinction and Bauman’s (1990) account of neo‐tribal lifestyles – both present social norms and belonging as 
the fundamental mechanisms underpinning its contemporary social patterning (see Southerton (2002) for a 
full discussion). In our use of the term  consumption norms should be interpreted as a subset of the much 
broader category of social norms which can affect behaviour. 
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product; (b) in a related manner, giving people information about what similar people achieve 
in saving energy, or retirement savings can significantly increase levels of savings (Allcott 
(2011))17; (c)  by developing trust between members of a norm group it can reduce 
transactions costs18; (d) for a number of consumption activities, such as reading a book or 
attending a concert, the benefits are not just the private experience but the subsequent 
opportunity to share thoughts about such experiences (the ‘water cooler’ effect) and this 
requires individuals to have overlapping sets of cultural interests; (e) for activities like 
provision of public goods, voting, or charitable giving evidence suggests that individuals are 
more willing to contribute if they know members of their norm group have contributed (Frey 
and Meier (2004), Tan and Bolle (2007), Gerber and Rogers (2009), Bucholz, Falkinger and 
Rubbelke (2012)). 
Over and above such direct benefits, however, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) have argued that 
an ability to identify with a group of people is a key part of self-identity and yields an 
important psychological benefit of belonging to a group, what Adam Smith referred to as the 
‘special pleasure of mutual sympathy’19. In the model of Ulph and Ulph (2014), which we 
summarise in this section, it is this pure psychological benefit of belonging to a group that we 
have in mind. 
Much of the literature on consumption norms does not provide a formal model of how 
consumption norms might emerge. The paper that is closest to the model reported here is 
the study by Bernheim (1994) of conformity. In his model people differ in terms of their types 
(measured by a single index distributed over some interval). Society has a pre-specified 
notion of an ideal type and people suffer a loss of self-esteem the further their type is from 
the ideal. Individual’s well-being depends on the utility they get from their actions, and the 
esteem in which they are held by others. If an individual’s type was public information, all an 
individual could do is to act to maximise utility. But an individual’s type is private information, 
and has to be inferred from one’s actions, so individuals have an incentive to bias their 
actions towards that which an ideal person would perform; this leads some individuals to do 
more than they would do to maximise utility and others to do less. There are two possible 
equilibria: a fully-revealing equilibrium and a pooling equilibrium in which a group of 
individuals whose types are closer to the ideal type carry out the same level of action – so 
the equilibrium specifies a common action norm and the group of people who adhere to this 
common norm.  
In Ulph and Ulph (2014) we focus directly on consumption behaviour and consumption 
norms, and we examine how behaviour influenced by such norms relates to traditional 
analysis of consumer demand captured by Marshallian demand curves.  Like Bernheim we 
want to explain endogenously how consumption norms change individual consumer 
                                                             
17
 See Bennett et al (2009) for a comprehensive analysis of the clustering of consumption activities based on 
overlapping cultural interests in the UK. 
18
This is linked to notions of social capital. It is important to distinguish between group membership 
developing greater trust between insiders – a positive social benefit – and developing a greater distrust of 
outsiders – a reduction in social benefit (see Putnam (2000) and Dasgupta (2000) for a recognition that social 
capital may have negative as well as positive effects) .  Hargreaves‐Heap and Zizzo (2009) construct a measure 
to test this distinction, and in their experiments they find it is the negative effect which predominates.  
19
 Hargreaves‐Heap and Zizzo (2009)  also develop a test to measure this psychological benefit of belonging  to 
a group; they find that it balances out the negative effect of group membership noted in the previous 
footnote. 
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behaviour, which consumption norms can emerge as equilibrium norms, and how many 
norms there might be. All behaviour is assumed to be individual – there is no process for 
communication or coordination.  
Unlike Bernheim all information is public.  In particular, to rule out other channels of 
interactions, we assume consumers are perfectly informed about the quality of the 
commodities being consumed and consumption is a private good. The crucial difference is 
that there is no concept of an ideal type of consumption, and the motivation to belong to a 
group is the pure psychological benefit discussed above. We also develop the welfare 
analysis of the model and use it to draw policy conclusions, including environmental policy.  
In this section we set out a special case of the more general model in Ulph and Ulph (2014). 
3.1  A Model of Consumption Norms 
There are 2 goods: good 1 which is the potential norm good20 and good 2 which is 
expenditure on all other consumption. For good 1 the unit cost of production is γ and each 
unit generates pollution with damage cost δ; we assume that in the absence of any policy 
the market for good is competitive and so market price p will equal unit cost of production, γ. 
For good 2 the unit cost of production is 1, it generates no pollution and its market price is 1.  
Individuals can choose whether or not to adhere to a norm.  If an individual chooses not to 
adhere to a norm, a typical consumer with  income M has utility function: 
  U(c, M – pc) = Ac-0.5c2 +M-pc    (19) 
with corresponding Marshallian demand: c0(p,A) = A – p. In this model income M plays no 
role in behaviour so there is no loss of generality in assuming it is the same for all 
consumers. 
If instead the consumer has chosen to adhere to some consumption norm c* then the utility 
of the typical consumer is now: 
 
2( , , , ) 0.5 *U c M pc Ac c M pc c cα ϕ α ϕ− = − + − − − +   (20) 
where α measure the individual’s strength of adherence to the norm21, or the utility cost per 
unit of consumption that differs from the norm, and φ measures the strength of the desire for 
conformity  - the pure psychological benefit the individual experiences from adhering to a 
norm, as discussed above. We emphasise that the norm c* is not chosen by any individual 
or group of individuals – it has emerged from past custom and practice.   
For the special case we shall assume there are just two types of consumers; a fraction θ 
have low demand for good 1, so A takes the value 0
L
A γ> > while the remaining fraction (1 
                                                             
20
 We need to interpret the concept of a good acting as consumption norm broadly, to encompass not just the 
characteristics of the good  but also the practices in which the good is deployed; so hosting a dinner party 
involves more than just the food and wine served but how it is served, the conversation that takes place etc. 
21
 Note that if we had expressed the cost of deviating from the norm as 0.5α(c – c*)
2
 then the first‐order 
condition for optimal consumption would be  A – c –p –α(c‐c*) =0, so if c = c* then c*=c
0
(p,A) so the norm has 
to be Marshallian demand, 
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– θ) of consumers have high demand where A takes the value AH > AL; the average value of 
A is (1 )
L H
A A Aθ θ= + − . 
There is a four-stage game. In stage 1 the government sets policy. In stage 2 the consumer 
decides whether to adhere to the prevailing norm or go it alone and choose the Marshallian 
demand. In stage 3 we determine which norms could serve as equilibrium norms. Finally in 
stage 4 the consumer chooses what to consume. We work backwards.  
3.1.1  Stage 4 
The solution to maximising (2) can be expressed as follows: there is a norm-consistent 
interval of consumption [ ( , , ), ( , )]c p A c p A
αα
 where: 
  
0
0
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
c p A c p A
c p A c p A
α
α
α
α
= −
= +
  (21)   
   such that the consumption choice of the individual is 
  
( , , *) * ( , ) * ( , )
( , , *) ( , ) * ( , )
( , , *) ( , ) * ( , )
c p A c c c p A c c p A
c p A c c p A c c p A
c p A c c p A c c p A
α α α
α α α
α α α
= ⇔ ≤ ≤
= ⇔ <
= ⇔ >
 (22) 
(21) shows that the norm-consistent interval is a symmetric interval around the Marshallian 
demand whose width, 2α, depends on the strength of adherence to a norm. (22) shows that 
if the norm lies within the norm-consistent interval then the consumer adheres to the norm; if 
the norm lies below the norm-consistent interval the consumer adheres to the lower bound of 
the interval, and conversely if the norm lies above the norm-consistent interval. The intuition 
is that the consumer is willing to adjust consumption away from the Marshallian level as long 
as the marginal loss of utility from deviating from the utility maximising level is lower than the 
marginal loss of utility from deviating from the norm; thereafter the consumer sticks at the 
bound of the interval. 
3.1.2 Stage 3   
In stage 3 we consider what could be equilibrium norms in our simple example of two groups 
of consumers. Consistent with the idea that norms just emerge from individual decisions and 
have no normative content, we use a very weak notion of equilibrium.  So a norm is an 
equilibrium if it is the average consumption of all those who choose to adhere to it.  We 
consider first the case where there is a single norm. 
(i) Single Norm:  There are two sub- cases.  
 A: 0.5( ) ( , ) ( , ) * ( , ) (1 ) ( , )
H L L H L H
A A c p A c p A c c p A c p A
α α α αα θ θ≤ − ⇒ < ⇒ = + −  (23a) 
B: 0.5( ) ( , ) ( , ) * [ ( , ), ( , )]
H L L H H L
A A c p A c p A c c p A c p A
α α α αα > − ⇒ > ⇒ ∈              (23b) 
In Case A the norm-consistent intervals of the two groups do not overlap; so the only 
equilibrium norm is a weighted average of the upper-bound of the norm-consistent interval of 
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the low-demand group and the lower-bound of the norm-consistent interval of the high-
demand group, where the weights are the proportions of the two groups in the total 
population. In Case B the norm-consistent intervals of the two groups do overlap, in which 
case any norm that lies in that interval is an equilibrium norm. Note that there are two 
possibilities:  if 0.5( ) ( )
H L H L
A A A Aα− < < − then the interval [ ( , ), ( , )]
H L
c p A c p A
α α is 
relatively narrow, and does not contain the Marshallian demands of either group; if 
( )
H L
A Aα ≥ − then the interval [ ( , ), ( , )]
H L
c p A c p A
α α  will contain the Marshallian demands 
of both groups. 
(ii) Two Norms: Again we consider the two sub-cases set out above. 
In Case A the low demand group could adhere to any norm below the upper bound of its 
norm-consistent interval, with the opposite for the high demand group. In Case B the same is 
true as for Case A except that the norms cannot lie in the overlap area.  
3.1.3 Stage 2. 
Turning to stage 2, note that adhering to a norm reduces consumers’ direct utility from 
consumption relative to just following their utility-maximising Marshallian demands. We now 
take account of the utility benefit of belonging to a group, φ, and as long as this exceeds the 
difference in utility between what consumers derive from adhering to the norm and what they 
would have got by going it alone and resorting to their Marshallian demands. 
3.1.4 Stage 1 
The above analysis explains why consumers may choose to adhere to consumption norms. 
We now turn to policy analysis. The government is concerned to maximise welfare defined 
by: 
2
2
( , *) [ 0.5 * ]
(1 )[ 0.5 * ] [ (1 ) ]
L H L L L L
H H H H L H
W c c c A c c c c
A c c c c c c
θ γ α ϕ
θ γ α ϕ δ θ θ
= − − − − + +
− − − − − + − + −
  (24) 
There are essentially two ‘distortions’ in this model – the environmental externality and the 
fact that consumers are not consuming their Marshallian demands, though they are deriving 
benefits from adhering to a norm.  
We begin by ignoring the environmental externality. Note from (23a) that in Case A, the 
equilibrium norm is sensitive to price, so it is possible to shift the norm closer to the level of 
demand that would arise under Marshallian demand, which will raise welfare while 
preserving the benefits of adhering to the norm.  Now we know that low demand consumers 
are consuming more than their Marshallian demand by an amount α while high demand 
consumers are underconsuming by a similar amount. So it is straightforward to show that if 
the government imposes a tax  
ˆ (2 1)τ α θ= −     (25) 
this will align aggregate consumption with a norm with the Marshallian demand. If θ > 0.5, so 
low demand consumers predominate, then the optimal policy will be a tax to dampen the 
effects of their ‘overconsumption’; if θ < 0.5, then high demand consumers predominate and 
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the optimal policy is a subsidy to boost demand; finally if θ = 0.5 the two effects cancel out 
and there is nothing the government needs to do.  
In Case B, it is clear from (23b) that the norm is not sensitive to modest changes in price. In 
this case, absent any environmental considerations, the best the government can do to align 
individual decisions with the optimum is to ensure that the Marshallian demand lies in the 
overlap of the norm-consistent intervals of norms.  This can be achieved by any tax/subsidy 
in the interval: 
   ( ) ( )ˆ (1 )H L H La a a aθ α τ α θ− − ≤ ≤ − − −     (26) 
In a wide range of circumstances this could be consistent with a zero tax. 
Whether implementing such a tax/subsidy policy will achieve the optimum is problematic, for 
large changes in price (through either a tax or a subsidy) could shift the interval
[ ( , ), ( , )]
H L
c p A c p A
α α  sufficiently that the equilibrium norm c* no longer lies in this interval. 
In that case c* would no longer be an equilibrium norm and consumers would revert to their 
Marshallian demands. 
Now consider environmental policy. The standard prescription from environmental 
economics would be to impose a Pigovian tax tˆ δ= . In Case A the optimal policy will be to 
impose the Pigovian tax in addition to the tax/subsidy derived from (25). So the overall policy 
will be to impose a tax ˆˆ (2 1)tτ α θ δ+ = − + , which could be negative. 
In Case B again if δ is relatively small the Pigovian tax will have no effect on consumption or 
pollution, while if it is large it could shift down the interval of consumption so that it no longer 
contains the norm, and consumers revert to their Marshallian demands. Of course these 
Marshallian demands with the Pigovian tax will be lower than they would be without the tax. 
Moreover, if 0.5( ) ( )
H L H L
A A A Aα− < < −  low demand consumers will revert to Marshallian 
demands which are for sure lower than the lower bound of the interval 
[ ( , ), ( , )]
H L
c p A c p A
α α  and hence lower than the norm. On the other hand high demand 
consumers will revert to their Marshallian demands which are for sure higher than the upper 
bound of the interval [ ( , ), ( , )]
H L
c p A c p A
α α  and hence higher than the norm22.  Could the 
latter effect outweigh the first two effects? The following example shows that there are 
parameter values for which this could be the case. 
3. 2 Example 
Suppose AL =30, AH = 40, α =6,  θ = .1,  γ =10,  and environmental damage cost per unit of 
consumption is δ = 3. There is a fixed benefit of adhering to a norm, φ, of  15. 
The standard environmental economics story if consumers had no norms would be as 
follows: 
                                                             
22
 Of course if α > (AH‐AL) then it is still possible that the norm lies between the two Marshallian demands and 
so the effects just described still apply 
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(i) Prior to policy intervention P0 = 10, Marshallian consumption of the two groups is: 
cL = 20, cH =30, total consumption c=0.1*CL+0.9*CH  =29, consumer  benefits are 
BL =200, BH = 450 so aggregate consumer benefits are B = 0.1*BL+ 0.9*BH = 425. 
Damage costs are 87, so net welfare is:  425-87=338. 
(ii) After policy intervention the new price is P1 = γ + δ = 13, so consumption of the 
two groups is cL =17, cH = 27, total consumption is c=0.1*cL+0.9*cH  =26 
consumer benefits are BL = 195.5, BH =445.5 so total consumer benefits are  B = 
0.1*BL+ 0.9*BH = 420.5. Damage costs are 78, so net welfare is 342.5.  
As usual in the conventional story, implementing environmental policy causes total 
consumption and hence direct consumer benefits to fall; the fall in consumption leads to 
lower pollution and lower damage costs, which more than offsets the reduction in direct 
consumer benefits. 
Now allow for norms.  
(iii) In the pre-policy equilibrium 24, 26
H L
c c= =  so the interval in which the 
equilibrium norm must lie is [24,26]. Suppose the norm is c* =25, to which both 
groups adhere. Consumer benefits are: BL = 187.5, BH = 437.5, so total consumer 
benefits are B = 0.1*BL+ 0.9*BH = 412.5 and damage costs are 75, so net welfare 
is 412.5 – 75 = 337.5. Total consumer benefits are less than in the Marshallian 
equilibrium in (i), so if we allow for a fixed benefit of adhering to a norm of 15 then 
consumer benefits are 427.5, which is higher than consumer benefits of 425 in (i), 
which justifies consumers adhering to the norm. Welfare including the benefit of 
adhering  to the norm  is 427.5-75= 352.5  
(iv) After the policy intervention, 21, 23LHC C= = so the norm of C* = 25 is no 
longer in the norm-consistent interval. So the outcome is as in (ii) above.  
So comparing (iii) and (iv) the implementation of conventional environmental policy, by 
making the previous norm infeasible, has caused total consumption to rise from 25 to 26, 
and total consumer benefits to rise from 412.5 to 420.5; this is made up of two elements; the 
increase in consumption and the fact that consumers are moving to their Marshallian 
demands. The rise in consumption causes pollution and hence environmental damage costs 
to rise from 75 to 78. Overall, welfare falls from 352.5 to 342.5. This reduction in welfare is 
made up of three elements: direct consumer benefits have risen by 8, environmental 
damage costs have worsened by 3, but the benefit of adhering to a norm of 15 has been 
lost, so there is a net welfare loss of 10.  
 So in this specific example, how conventional environmental policy as recommended by 
environmental economists affects the economy when there are consumption norms is the 
exact opposite of what is expected to happen with conventional Marshallian consumption. Of 
course this is just an example for a specific set of parameters and there will be other 
parameters for which the usual effects apply. This raises the question of how could policy 
makers know when conventional policies will work and when they will not work, and are 
there other policies that could be implemented when there are consumption norms. We 
discuss these issues in the final section. 
 
20 
 
4. Altruism and Moral Behaviour 
So far we have considered the case where individual consumption behaviour is influenced  
by the decisions of others.  This is driven by a desire either to “Keep up with the Joneses” or 
to conform to others’ behaviour and so feel a sense of community/solidarity with them.   
We have recognised that the consumption behaviour under consideration could generate 
environmental externalities, and have examined the appropriate environmental policies (for 
example, a Pigovian tax)  when consumption decisions are subject to such social pressures 
and contrasted these with the appropriate  policies when individual behaviour is not 
influenced  by that of others – the traditional assumption.  Essentially these policies are 
designed to correct the environmental externality by getting individuals to face the full 
economic and social cost of their decisions.  
In that analysis we still maintained the traditional assumption that individuals were simply 
maximising their individual utility – albeit adjusted to reflect the factors that generate the 
influence of social pressures on their behaviour.  So individuals failed to take into account 
the fact that their own and other peoples’ consumption was generating emissions that could 
cause damage both to themselves and others. In this section we consider what happens 
when individuals might be aware of this connection.   
Now there are a number of reasons why individuals might behave as if their consumption 
had no consequences for themselves and others.  The first is that they might calculate that 
their consumption is so insignificant relative to the total emissions being generated by 
everyone else that whatever they do will make no difference to total  emissions and hence to 
the damage that they themselves and others might suffer.  Such a calculation might be 
made particularly in the context of a global mixed pollutant such as CO2 emissions that is 
one of the drivers of climate change.   
It is precisely this set-up that is the focus of the analysis in this section.  We capture the idea 
of insignificance by considering a continuum economy of atomless individuals.  Here, by 
construction, aggregate emissions are just the average level of individual emissions 
multiplied by the size/mass of the population, and, average emissions are completely 
unaffected by the emissions generated by any single individual – indeed by any single group 
of individuals.   
We show that if individuals maximise their own utility then individual behaviour is completely 
unaffected by any consideration of the damage that might be caused, and the appropriate 
policy is a traditional Pigovian tax equal to the marginal damage caused by a unit increase in 
total emissions. We show that this conclusion continues to hold even if individuals display 
altruism and care about the well-being of others, and that both individual behaviour and 
optimal government policy are completely unaffected by the degree of altruism. 
It follows that, for behaviour to be responsive to potential environmental consequences, we 
need to posit an alternative theory of behaviour in which individuals no longer just maximise 
individual utility (however constructed) but rather act in a different pro-social/moral fashion.  
There are a number of different accounts of such pro-social behaviour – which we review – 
and then consider a more recent account by Daube and Ulph (2014).  Here individuals 
deliberately act in a way that does not maximise individual utility but instead act “morally”  by 
choosing a level of consumption that balances off the costs of individual  utility forgone by 
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not maximising this utility against the purely hypothetical moral gain that would arise – to 
themselves and others -  if everyone were to make the same consumption choice as 
themselves.  We assume that individuals might differ in this propensity to act morally – which 
we capture by the weight placed on the hypothetical moral gain.   
We show that if individuals are willing to act in this way then: 
(i) Individuals will adjust their consumption to take account of the impact of their 
decisions on themselves and others; 
(ii) Altruism now matters in the sense that the greater the degree of altruism the 
greater the change in individual behaviour; 
(iii) Nevertheless the optimal environmental policy is precisely the same as that 
which arises in the traditional analysis.   
The intuition behind these results is as follows. 
(i) Since individuals care about the moral rightness of their action they are willing to 
adjust their consumption towards the social optimum since they recognise that 
hypothetically they and everyone else would be better off were everyone to follow 
this course of action.  They recognise that they will pay a private cost in terms of 
reduced well-being by acting in this way, but are prepared to balance this off 
against the hypothetical moral gain and so are prepared to adjust behaviour to 
take account of its full impact on themselves and others. 
(ii) Altruism now matters because the greater the weight that individuals place on the 
well-being of others the greater the hypothetical moral benefit from deviating from 
the conventional utility-maximising behaviour. However the degree of altruism 
has no effect on the cost of deviating from conventional utility-maximising 
behaviour. 
(iii) Now when people behave morally the moral gain from such behaviour is purely 
hypothetical since any change in their behaviour will not affect the behaviour of 
others. So realised well-being is just the standard measure of individual well-
being – albeit evaluated at a sub-optimal level of consumption of the dirty good.  
Since individuals may differ in the extent to which they act morally these 
differences in consumption behaviour introduce horizontal inequalities.  So social 
welfare is below the optimum because (a) there is now horizontal inequality; (b) 
the level of pollution is sub-optimally high.  However if the government sets the 
tax at the standard Pigovian optimum, then everyone will recognise that just 
maximising their individual utility will produce the social optimum, so, whatever 
their degree of morality everyone will consume the same amount of the dirty 
good – namely the social optimum – so setting this tax will eliminate all the 
horizontal inequality AND achieve the optimum amount of pollution.   
So governments should not use the fact that individuals themselves care about the 
environment and are willing to adjust their behaviour as an excuse for not pursuing tough 
environmental policies. 
4.1 Brief Review of Literature 
There are a number of different accounts of both altruism and of why individuals might 
behave in what is called a pro-social fashion. For example, Andreoni (1988) showed that in 
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large economies the share of the population making contributions to a public good tends to 
zero as the free-riding effect dominates.  However, when the contribution to the public good 
also yields some private benefit to the individual, voluntary contributions can be consistent 
with standard economic models.  Andreoni (1990) models the individual's utility not just as a 
function of the consumption of the private and public goods, but also of the individual's 
contribution to the public good itself. This is commonly referred to as the ‘warm-glow’ effect. 
This ‘warm-glow’ can be interpreted as a self-image gain from contributing to the public 
good. 
While Andreoni makes no assumptions regarding the psychological cause of this ‘warm-
glow’ from contribution to a public good, various other authors have developed more 
sophisticated models with regard to the underlying motivation.  These models usually work 
on the premise that individuals derive intrinsic value from a self-image desire or social 
norms.  For example in Bénabou and Tirole (2006) the ‘reputational payoff’ from contribution 
to a public good is a function of the belief others have regarding the type of consumer this 
individual is, while in Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) the value of social approval 
depends on whether the individual himself approves of the person who approves him. In  
Nyborg, Howarth, and Brekke (2006) individuals are also motivated by a concern for self-
image, which depends on their view of the total benefit a ‘green’ good yields to the 
population, as well as their view of what share of the population is choosing to consume the 
‘green’ option. To some extent this also captures the idea of social norms or peer pressure. 
Furthermore, because what matters is the individual’s perception of what others do, it is  
argued that policy makers may be able to influence this perception, for example through 
advertising. On the other hand, Brekke, Kverndokk, and Nyborg (2003) develop a model 
where individuals are able to make a more sophisticated calculation of the “morally ideal 
effort”. This is achieved by evaluating the socially optimal contribution to a public good if they 
and everybody else were to make the same choice. The individual then derives self-image 
value depending on how close their contribution is to that socially optimal level.   
The contributions to the literature on pro-social behaviour discussed so far essentially all 
assume no direct preferences for the welfare of others, and so are examples of what is 
called  Impure Altruism, whereby individuals take account of only their own self-image which 
depends on their contribution to some public good.  There is a more long-standing account 
of altruism whereby individuals may be motivated by a more direct concern about the welfare 
of others.  Two main types of such altruism are Pure Altruism and Paternalistic Altruism. 
Pure Altruism captures the idea that an individual’s utility may to some degree be a function 
of others’ well-being/utility.  Applications that use this type of altruism have often been based 
on smaller environments, such as the family23, where an individual’s behaviour is likely to 
have a direct impact on those about whom he/she cares and so will be to some extent 
internalised. Paternalistic Altruism assumes an individual’s utility is a function of a specific 
component of other peoples’ utility24.  In an environmental context, this component may be 
the damage experienced by others from the environmentally harmful good. While Impure 
Altruism only takes into account the individual’s contribution to the externality, Paternalistic 
Altruism means that the individual is affected by others’ experience of the externality, 
regardless of the individual’s contribution. 
                                                             
23
 For example Becker (1974), (1981) 
24
 See Archibald and Donaldson (1976) 
23 
 
All these types of altruism still assume that individuals maximise their utility when acting pro-
socially. Genuine Altruism as defined by Kennett (1980), on the other hand, requires that 
individuals’ behaviour is driven by some function other than maximising their utility. Since 
this implies a deviation from ‘rational’ behaviour that economists usually assume, it is the 
most drastic form of altruism.  In particular Johansson (1997) finds that with Genuine 
Altruism – modelled as a situation where individuals maximise a weighted sum of their own 
and others’ utility - the optimal tax is lower than the standard level25. The socially optimal 
level of consumption is unchanged from the standard level as this type of altruism does not 
affect it, but the individual will demand this lower level of consumption due to the function 
maximised and therefore the requirement on the tax level is reduced. If the weight in the 
maximisation were equal between the individual's utility and all others' utility, the tax rate 
would drop to zero.  
The theory set out in Daube and Ulph (2014) and summarised here is an example of 
Genuine Altruism but yields very different conclusions, since we show that the optimal tax is 
the same as the standard Pigovian tax.  
4. 2 A Theory of Moral Behaviour 
Consider a population that comprises a continuum of potentially different types of individuals, 
indexed by , 0 1k k≤ ≤ . The distribution of types is given by the density function 
1
0
( ) 0, 0 1,   where  ( ) 1f k k f k dk> ≤ ≤ =∫
26.   The size/mass of the population is denoted by 
0M > .   
Absent any considerations of altruism or morality, a typical individual has a utility function 
that depends on  just two goods:  the individual’s consumption of a dirty  good, z, and their 
expenditure on all other goods, x.  The consumer price of this second good is normalised to 
1, and the consumer price of the dirty good is denoted by p.  Assume that utility is linear in 
expenditure on all other goods27 but strictly increasing and concave in the consumption of 
the dirty good, so  
                                           ( )( , )u x z x zϕ= +                                       (27) 
where (.)ϕ  is  a strictly increasing and strictly concave function28.   It is assumed that, in the 
absence of any government transfers, each individual’s income is y > 0, so the utility arising 
from consuming an amount z of the dirty good is  
                                       ( )u z y pzϕ= + − .                                       (28) 
                                                             
25
 In fact Johansson (1997) derives the socially optimal tax on an externality for all four types of altruism described above 
relative to the socially optimal tax level under standard behaviour. He shows that depending on the type of altruism 
analysed, the socially optimal tax on the externality can be higher, lower, or equal to the socially optimal tax without 
altruism. 
26
 For simplicity this heterogeneity in the population will play no role initially and everyone will be effectively identical 
27
 This simplifying assumption is made in order to remove both effects from behaviour and any concerns about income 
inequality from the welfare analysis.   
28
 Formally, we assume:   ( ) 0; ( ) 0z zϕ ϕ′ ′′> <  
24 
 
Assume that each unit of the dirty good creates 1 unit of emissions so total emissions are 
E M z= , where 
1
0
( )kz z f k dk= ∫  is the average consumption of the dirty good in the 
population, and is unaffected  by a change in the consumption, 
k
z  of any given individual or 
type of individual.  This captures the central idea that motivates the analysis – that 
individuals correctly calculate that their consumption has no effect on aggregate emissions 
and so on any damage that they – and others - might suffer.  Let ( )D E  denote the 
individual damage that everyone will suffer when total emissions are E . We assume that for 
all positive levels of emissions marginal damage is strictly positive and non-decreasing29.   
In addition it is assumed throughout that the dirty good is produced by a perfectly 
competitive industry with constant unit costs of production c > 0.  So the producer price of 
the dirty good is c.  We allow the possibility that the government imposes a specific tax 0t ≥
on the dirty good, so its consumer price is p c t= + .  Finally it is assumed that the tax 
revenues raised on the consumption of the dirty good are remitted to everyone via  a lump-
sum transfer t zσ = , so individuals should also correctly recognise that this transfer is 
unaffected by their own consumption.  
4.2.1  Standard Theory 
Taking account of the damage caused by emissions, and the lump-sum transfer, a typical 
individual will take the average level of emissions, z , as a constant and choose his/her 
consumption of the dirty good to maximise well-being – utility minus damage: 
                   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )z y t z pz D M z z y t z c t z D M zϕ ϕ+ + − − = + + − + −       (29) 
generating a standard demand for the dirty good,  ( )z p% , that is  a strictly decreasing 
function of price alone and is characterised by  
                                               ( )z p c tϕ′ = = +% .                                   (30) 
Social welfare is assumed to be the sum of individual well-being and, recognising that the 
tax on the consumption of the dirty good is transferred to everyone via the lump-sum 
transfer, is given by 
                     ( ){ } ( )1 10 0( ) ( )k k kS M z y cz f k dk MD M z f k dkϕ= + − −  ∫ ∫       (31) 
Since, at this stage in the analysis, everyone has the same preferences, it is socially optimal 
to have everyone consume the same amount of the dirty good, z$ . This is characterised by 
the condition that individual marginal benefit from an additional unit of consumption equals 
its full marginal social cost – the cost of production plus marginal damage.  Formally 
                                              ( ) ( )ˆ ˆz c MD Mzϕ′ ′= + .               (32)   
                                                             
29
 Formally , we assume,  0 ( ) 0; ( ) 0E D E D E′ ′′∀ > > ≥  
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By comparing (30) and (32) it can be seen that the social optimum can be supported by 
individual behaviour through the imposition of the optimal Pigovian tax, t$ – equal to 
marginal damage at the optimum – on each unit of consumption of the dirty good. 
                                                 ( )ˆt MD Mz′=$                          (33) 
4.2.2  Introducing Pure Altruism 
Suppose now that we allow the possibility that individuals care about not just their own well-
being but that of everyone else.  Since individuals are atomless, this essentially means that 
individuals place some weight on social welfare, S, as defined by (31).   From (29) and (31) 
the well-being of a typical individual is now: 
                                        ( ) ( )( ) ( )z y t z c t z D M z Sϕ α+ + − + − +       (34) 
where 0α > is the weight placed on the well-being of others – the degree of altruism – and, 
for simplicity, is assumed to be the same for everyone30.   When choosing his/her 
consumption of the dirty good, an individual will recognise that their decision will have no 
effect on the private consumption decisions, 
k
z  of everyone else, and so both components 
of social welfare that appear on the RHS of (31) – and so both social welfare, S, and 
average consumption of the dirty good, z , will be treated as constants.  This means that 
individual consumption decisions are again characterised by (31) and so are independent of 
α.  
Social welfare is the sum of individual well-beings as given by (34) and so is now ( )1 Sα+ .  
Maximising social welfare is therefore equivalent to maximising S and so the optimal 
allocation of resources is also independent of α, and is characterised by having everyone 
consume the same amount, z$  of the dirty good, where z$ is given by (32).  This optimum can 
again be supported by the optimal Pigovian tax, t$,  as given by (33).  
So we have the following: 
Proposition 5  In an atomless economy, both individual behaviour and the socially  optimal 
allocation of resources and supporting Pigovian tax rate are independent of the degree of 
altruism, α. 
4. 2 .3 Introducing Moral Behaviour 
Consider now the alternative calculus that individuals might make when choosing their 
consumption of the dirty good. Suppose that the government sets a tax ˆ, 0t t t≤ <  that is 
sub-optimally low31, resulting in general over-consumption of the dirty good.   
If an individual considers choosing a level of consumption of the dirty good, z, that differs 
from that which maximises well-being as defined by (34) given the price p c t= +  – namely 
                                                             
30
 It can be shown that all the conclusions are unaffected if α varies across the population.  
31
 The analysis that follows also applies if the tax is sub‐optimally  high. 
26 
 
( )z p% . Then, recalling that individuals treat the lump-sum transfer, t zσ = , the level of 
emissions and hence damages ( )D M z , and the level of well-being accruing to everyone 
else, S ,  as constants, the individual will recognise that this choice of z  incurs a direct loss 
of personal well-being given by: 
                             [ ]{ } ( )( ) ( ) ( )L z z p pz p z pzϕ ϕ= − − −  % %         (35) 
On the other hand the individual will evaluate the morality of such an alternative choice of 
consumption in terms of its hypothetical moral benefit -  the benefit that will accrue to both 
themselves and everyone else were everyone to choose the same level of consumption, z , 
rather than the utility-maximising choice, z%.   Taking account of this common choice on both 
the level of emissions – and hence damage – and the lump-sum transfer available to 
everyone, the hypothetical moral benefit from such a choice of z is 
                  
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
M z z cz D Mz M z cz D Mz
z cz D Mz M z cz D Mz
ϕ α ϕ
ϕ α ϕ
= − − + − − −  
− − + − −  % % % % % %
       (36) 
Assume that, in deciding what value of z to choose, an individual maximizes a weighted sum 
of hypothetical moral benefit.  So an individual chooses z to maximise  
                             ( ) (1 ) ( )M z L zµ µ− −                                 (37) 
where , 0 1µ µ≤ ≤  measures an individual’s propensity to act morally, and is assumed to 
vary across individuals in the population. Substitute (35) and (36) into (37)  and it follows that 
z is chosen to maximise 
                             [ ]( ) ( ) (1 )z cz kD Mz k tϕ − − + −                   (38) 
where  
           
( )1
1
M
k
M
µ α
µα
+
=
+
 and so 0 1; 0 0; 1 1k k kµ µ≤ ≤ = ⇔ = = ⇔ = .      (39) 
The parameter k is said to measure the extent to which an individual is prepared to behave 
as a pure Kantian, and, given that  the propensity to act morally, µ, varies in the population, 
so too will the extent to which an individual is prepared to behave in a Kantian fashion.  
The first-order condition characterising individual choice is  
                                     [ ]( ) ( ) (1 )z c kMD Mz k tϕ′ ′= + + − .                (40) 
If we compare (40) with (30) and (32) we see that: 
• If 0 0kµ = ⇒ =   then  ( )z z c t= +%  
• If 1 1kµ = ⇒ =   then  ˆz z=  
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•  If 0 1 0 1kµ< < ⇒ < <   then  ( )zˆ z z c t< < +%  
So any level of individual consumption between the conventional self-interested utility-
maximising level and the social optimum can emerge as an outcome of this behaviour. This 
is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Notice also that: 
• If 0µ =   then  k = 0  irrespective of the value of α 
• If 0α =   then  k µ=  
• If 0µ >  then  k is a strictly increasing function of α, with  1 as  k α→ →∞ . 
So we have established the following: 
Proposition 6 
(i) Any level of individual consumption between the conventional self-interested 
utility-maximising level and the social optimum can emerge as an outcome of this 
behaviour;   
(ii) a propensity to act morally is both necessary and sufficient for individuals to 
adjust their behaviour away from the self-interested utility-maximising level 
towards the socially optimal level; 
(iii) a degree of altruism is neither necessary nor sufficient for individuals to adjust 
their behaviour away from the self-interested utility-maximising level towards the 
socially optimal level; 
(iv) nevertheless, if individuals have a propensity to act morally, then altruism matters 
and the more altruistic individuals are the more they move their consumption 
towards the social optimum. 
It is important to recognise that in undertaking this calculus individuals make no 
assumption that anyone else will actually change their behaviour.  Thus the moral benefit 
is purely hypothetical and never accrues to individuals.  So realised individual well-being 
from any given choice of z is given by (34) and consequently social welfare is just 
(1 )Sα+ where S is given by (31).   
In terms of this measure of welfare a given allocation arising from individual behaviour - 
as described by (40) -  will fall short of the full social optimum, for two reasons: 
(a)  if the government sets the wrong tax rate then aggregate emissions and damage 
may be sub-optimal 
(b) since individuals differ in their propensity to act morally, consumption choices will 
differ and so there will be both horizontal and vertical inequality.  
However it should be clear that if the government sets the optimal tax t t= $then, 
irrespective of their propensity to act morally  everyone  will choose the same level of 
consumption, z$and so the economy will achieve the social optimum, by both getting the 
optimal level of emissions and eliminating inequality. Thus we have: 
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Proposition 7   In a setting where individuals act morally the optimal tax rate is the standard 
Pigovian tax t$ that arises in the situation where individuals act in the conventional self-
interested fashion. 
Two important policy conclusions from this analysis.   
1. The fact that individuals may act morally and adjust their consumption of the dirty 
good towards the social optimum is not an argument for governments to set 
environmental policies that are too lax. 
2. If governments try to adjust individual behaviour, then it is more effective to try to 
induce them to act morally rather than to promote altruism.   
5. Conclusions  
In this paper we have summarised some of our recent research which has sought to build 
links between economics and sociology by studying consumer behaviour in a social context. 
Because we study interactions between the decisions of individual consumers it is natural to 
analyse these as Nash equilibria of the appropriate consumption games. We summarised 
our research in three forms of interactions between consumers: competitive or conspicuous 
consumption, consumption norms, and altruism and moral behaviour. As we said in the 
Introduction the key question is whether such analysis generates interesting analytical 
results or implications for empirical analysis or policy. We believe the analysis does both. 
In the case of competitive consumption we showed that there are cases, albeit very special, 
of utility functional forms and parameter values for which if all goods (which could include 
leisure) are conspicuous there will be no market distortion, and there may be no need for 
taxes (or equivalent policies) to correct consumption or environmental externalities. In the 
more normal case where consumers overwork to fund overconsumption then there is an 
interesting implication that the worst-off individuals in society may not be those whose 
productivity (and hence wage rate) are lowest, because they will not work, but rather those 
whose wage is just above the minimum level which induces them to work. In the case of 
consumption norms we showed that if the differences between consumer groups with high 
and low demand for the norm good are not too large, then there may be a common norm 
which is completely insensitive to changes in prices, induced, say, by an environmental tax, 
and in cases where such a price change makes the prevailing norm unsustainable then the 
environmental tax could lead to higher consumption, higher environmental damage and 
lower welfare. Finally we showed that altruism may have no effect on people’s consumption 
(and any resulting environmental damage) and what matters more is to persuade individuals 
to act more morally rather than to become more altruistic; even if that can be done, the 
optimal environmental tax is unaffected by the extent of such moral behaviour.  
A potential implication for empirical analysis is that these forms of behaviour can have 
important effects on the responsiveness of consumption to prices, but because these 
different factors have potentially quite different policy implications it is important to not just 
estimate these price-elasticities but to test what factors drive consumer behaviour. Finally in 
terms of environmental policies, the standard environmental economics recommendation for 
Pigovian taxes may either be ineffective, or, in special cases, counter-productive, so there is 
a need to consider carefully what other policy approaches (for example, environmental 
29 
 
information and education) might work to say shift consumption norms or induce more moral 
behaviour.     
All this suggests the need to continue to build links between the social sciences, particularly 
sociology and economics, and to consider what other aspects of consumption behaviour 
could be fruitfully studied using the kind of game theoretic approaches we have used in this 
paper. 
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